In this supplementary file we present further predictions and explore additional tests of the connection between coups, civil war risk, accountability avoidance, and the presence of progovernment militias. We argued in the main paper that based on pre-existing research, semiofficial militias that are outside of the regular military chain-of-command but with a visible link to the government will be most likely to be used for coup-proofing. However, it is possible that governments may also utilize irregular militias to coup-proof that are not obviously tied to the government. These more informal militias are also coded in our underlying data. Therefore, we re-analyze six models from the main paper using a new indicator that includes both semi-official and informal militia linkages in a state as the dependent variable. These results can be found in Table A1 and A2.
indicators (Models 2.3 and 2.4) provide a meaningful boost in predictive capacity for the model both in-sample and out-of sample. Table A2 illustrates that the disaggregated model also continues to be the preferred model when compared to the others as we present in the main text.
The same development puzzle highlighted in the main text continues to exist in these data.
We also investigated whether dropping states that only had informal militias from our sample altered our results. Since this changes our sample we can no longer compare AIC values.
However, the inferences from the coefficients in Table A3 are again consistent.
In Figure A1 we analyze what observations are both predicted and surprising given our best-fitting out-of-sample model (Model 4.1 in the main paper). This figure plots the out-ofsample predicted probabilities of a militia being present in a given country in a particular year on the x-axis, and the actual observed measure on the y-axis. We plot the text of the three-letter country codes and the year of the observation to aid in identification. 1 The size of the text is proportional to the absolute value of the difference between the actual observation and our prediction from the model with the disaggregated indicators (Model 4.1) to allow us to see which observations are clear misses and which ones are more accurate. 2 In the upper-right hand corner, the model predicts cases of militia presence well in India, Iraq, Uganda, China, and the Philippines. It also comes close for Libya, Saudi Arabia and Rwanda. The largest errors that would lead to false negatives in the forecast appear to be in Russia and Estonia. Similarly, in the bottom row, the model accurately predicts the absence of semi-official militias in Gambia, Togo, Kuwait, Greece, and Lebanon, among others. However, the model predicts a high probability of seeing militias in Colombia and Nigeria in 2005 and Ghana in 2002, when these groups were measured as being absent. Although no semi-official militias have been coded for these countries during these years, both Colombia and Nigeria had informal militias in 2005, which lack the official and recognized status of semi-official militias. While informal militias are often associated with governments that have an incentive to avoid accountability and need low-cost armed groups that can be mobilized quickly (e.g., Alvarez 2006), we would not expect these groups to be used for coup-proofing. In Table A4 we explore whether the process by which semi-official militias are created changed after the end of the Cold War. The inclusion of a dummy variable marking the post-1989 time period was inconsistent. Regardless of the inclusion of this variable our results were consistent.
Testing for a structural break in accountability avoidance after the Cold War yielded a lower AIC value and an insignificant F-statistic (.57, p-value=.45 ). Next, while we created indicators of civil war risk explicitly to avoid the possibility that the creation of militias would, within a given year, make civil war more likely, and thus induce bias in our estimates, it is important to check the robustness of our assumption. One way to explore this is to recreate our index without the recent civil war measure. This indicator is the most likely component to be correlated with sub-annual changes in both militias and civil wars. However, we should point out that the assumption that militias make civil wars independently more likely within a given year relies on the assumption that leaders either do not know this, or want to bring about their own demise, which we find unlikely. Regardless, we believe checking the robustness of our civil war risk indicator to this change is useful. Table A5 is thus reassuring. In all cases, the use of a civil war index that does not include previous civil wars as an indicator leads to the identical inferences as those reported in the main text. To probe whether our variables are simply measuring either time-constant regional variation in militia propensity or episodic cross-sectional shocks in a given year, as opposed to our indicators of interest, we ran models with regional and then yearly fixed effects. Nine regions were coded based on the Correlates of War definitions. 3 These results are included in Table A6 . Finally, we re-estimate our Model 3.3 from Table 3 the main text, but using lagged values of each index. We find the same substantive results, shown in Table A7 . 
